This paper develops a simple model of the rise and fall of the large corporate lab. Large firms can either grow through internal research carried out inside their labs, or by commercializing external inventions created by start-ups. Invention by start-ups is spurred by university research. Internal research exhibits an inverted-U pattern driven by two trends: (i) the rise of university research and (ii) the increasing importance of science to invention. We use the model to assess whether the substitution of internal research with external invention can result in welfare losses due to insufficient diversity in the innovation ecosystem. If large firms and start-ups focus on different types of inventions, large firms can have a socially excessive incentive to focus on commercializing external inventions, to the detriment of internal research. This occurs when complementary assets confer a substantial advantage to large firms but other start-ups are already trying to commercialize similar inventions, so that the social value of large firms commercializing start-up inventions is limited. The model shows that, despite social benefits in facilitating external innovation, a division of innovative labor may reduce diversity in the types of innovations produced.
Science is, surely, a very practical activity but, typically, only in the long-run (Rosenberg, 1991: 337).
Introduction
This paper brings together three themes that featured prominently in Nathan Rosenberg's research:
(i) the impact of science on technology (e.g., Rosenberg, 1974 Rosenberg, , 1990 Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994) ,
(ii) the idea that scientific and technological progress proceeds through the interactions of many actors (e.g., Rosenberg, 1993, 1998) , and (iii) the recognition of the fundamental role of diversity and experimentation in economic growth (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Rosenberg, 1992 ). Our contribution is to provide some new evidence on how the US innovation ecosystem is changing, and to discuss some of the possible drivers and implications of these trends, with special focus on the issue of diversity of organizational forms within the ecosystem.
The traditional, "linear" model of science and innovation holds that universities perform (basic) research, and industry focuses on developing and commercializing this research. While there is much truth to this view, scholars have also long recognized that this picture is incomplete. Many universities have strong links with industry and firms, large and small, have made important contributions to science.
Scholars have also noted that, within the US innovation ecosystem, the relative importance of these actors-universities, large corporations, and small science-based start-ups-has changed over time. Large corporate lab are disappearing (e.g., Coombs and Georghiou, 2002; Mowery, 2009 , Arora, Belenzon and Patacconi, 2017), while new technology firms, often funded by venture capital, have become prominent in many sectors (e.g., Drake, 2014) . Institutional developments such as the strengthening of intellectual property rights and the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 have also encouraged universities and small firms to patent and licence their technologies, contributing to entrepreneurial dynamism in the US. Mowery (2009: 1) argues that in many ways these developments have not create an entirely new system, but rather "revived important elements of the industrial research "system" of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries", where large corporations mainly relied on small inventors and technology markets to provide growth opportunities.
In this paper, after summarizing previous contributions, we provide some additional evidence on the changing structure of the US innovation ecosystem. Then we propose a simple model of its evolution. The model captures the rise and fall of the large corporate lab. Large firms can either grow through internal research carried out inside their labs, or commercialize inventions created by start-ups. We will sometimes refer to the latter strategy where large firms and start-ups collaborate in technology markets as 'open innovation'. Invention by start-ups is spurred by university research.
The inverted-U pattern of internal research is driven by two trends: (i) the rise of university research and (ii) the increasing importance of science to invention.
The intuition for the result is that, because the usefulness of science to invention is initially limited, large firms are reluctant to make substantial investments in internal research. They prefer to rely on cheaper solutions acquired externally, even if external inventions are themselves not plentiful. However, as science becomes more important to invention, the incentives to invest in internal research rise. The large corporate labs is created. At some point, however, the size of the university sector grows so large that external inventions become again attractive outside options.
Internal research declines, and we return to a situation where most innovations are based on external inventions.
We use the model to address a fundamental issue in the innovation literature: "whether markets, left to themselves, are likely to spawn a socially desirable degree of firm [and innovation] heterogeneity" (Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell and Klepper, 2000: 1017) . We find that, if startup invention is plentiful and large firms' complementary assets are important, then markets are likely to invest too little in internal research, and engage too much in open innovation. There is socially excessive homogeneity in innovation, as large firms tend to focus on the same type of innovations as small firms through collaboration, using their complementary assets to commercialize these innovations and win the market. This could be the case in recent times when government funding, venture capital, global supply chains and on-demand labor and capital inputs arguably facilitate start-up formation and scale-up.
However, when it is difficult for start-ups to commercialize their inventions independently, the social benefits of collaboration between large firms and start-ups are substantial. In that case, large firms are likely to engage too little in open innovation from society's viewpoint, because of rent sharing with start-ups. Thus, markets can also overinvest in internal research, and open innovation can be underprovided, precisely when start-up innovations are fewer and more socially valued.
Evolution of the US innovation ecosystem
The systematic application of science to industry is a relatively recent phenomenon. For most of human history, technological progress rested largely on the efforts of artisans and tinkerers, often with limited scientific training, trying to solve specific practical problems. Josiah Wedgwood, the entrepreneur generally credited with introducing industrial methods in the manufacture of pottery, is a case in point. Born in 1730, Josiah Wedgwood, left school at age 9 to start working in the family pottery business (Koehn, 1997) . Through systematic experimentation, which he recorded in his Experiment Books, Wedgwood developed several innovations, most notably in creamware and glazing. These innovations allowed Wedgwood to become one of the wealthiest entrepreneurs of the 18th century; however, it is not clear whether they could be defined as 'science-based', as they were hardly grounded on scientific theory. 1 ' 2
The application of science to industry became more common towards the end of the 19th century, when a number of large companies in Germany and the US began hiring scientists and newly minted PhD students. A factor that contributed to the growing employment of scientists in industry was certainly the recognition of the great practical relevance of many recent scientific discoveries in fields such as electricity and organic chemistry. 3 Reversing the usual conception of industry building on 'abstract' science, however, it must also be recognized that in many instances scientific "understanding followed practice" (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986: 247) . Many sciences, such as chemistry, electric engineering, and genetics have developed as an effort to understand and improve upon current industrial practices, and to solve practical problems. The case of Sadi Carnot, the engineer generally credited with inventing thermodynamics, is emblematic. He made his greatest 1 See Schofield (1959) for a discussion of some of Wedgwood's contributions. Perhaps most notably, Wedgwood invented the first pyrometer to measure the temperature of kilns during the firing of pottery, and for this he was elected a member of the Royal Society in England.
2 Indirectly, Josiah Wedgwood certainly made a major contribution to science: The Wedgwood family fortune helped underwrite the voyage of Charles Darwin, Josiah's grandson, aboard the Beagle.
3 As Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) note, Western science was arguably "practical" because the experimental method kept it solidly anchored to reality.
contributions to science while studying how to improve the efficiency of steam engines. Interestingly, he found that engineering practice had already anticipated the prescriptions from the theory he had developed (Stokes, 1997).
A historical perspective
Over the last 150 years, the United States has risen from a relatively backward position in science and technology to a position of undisputed pre-eminence. In this section we summarize the development of the US scientific-industrial complex, which has been extensively described by, inter alia, Nelson (1994, 1996) , Hounshell (1996) and Mowery (2009) . We supplement their accounts with some recent, large-scale evidence.
Our discussion focuses primarily on research, rather than development, and highlights the changing roles of three key actors in the US innovation ecosystem: (i) universities and other public research institutions, such as the Federal labs and the National Institute of Health (henceforth, "universities" for short), (ii) large corporations and their corporate labs (henceforth, "large firms"), and (iii) individual inventors, small firms and science-based start-ups (henceforth, "small firms" or "startups"). We will largely neglect the very important role of federal government in identifying strategic American universities had, from the early days of the republic to the end of World War II, a widespread reputation for being oriented toward "practice and vocation" (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1996: 88) . Colleges catered to the needs of the their communities by teaching subjects such as agriculture and home economics, while research and training also tended to reflect the demands of local industries. The University of Akron, for instance, trained personnel for the local rubber 4 As in most long-term historical processes, identifying specific start and end dates for given periods is difficult. Mowery (2009) , for instance, takes 1985 as the start date of the third period in the development of industrial R&D in the US. We chose 1980 because (i) it is simpler to divide the whole period of analysis (1870-to date) in decades, and (ii) the Bayh-Dole Act and other important institutional developments took place in the early 1980's.
industry and became well known for its research in the processing of rubber. The universities of Kentucky and North Carolina did extensive work on developing technologies for the tobacco industry (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1996) . Scientists at the University of Oklahoma pioneered the use of reflection seismology for oil and gas exploration in the 1920's and to this day the University of Oklahoma boasts one of the leading petroleum engineering programs in the US. But despite these and other examples of excellence, it is fair to say that American universities lagged well behind their leading European counterparts in terms of research quality. Perhaps the most revealing indicator in this respect was the fact, noted by many observers, that most of America's leading scientists got their training in Europe.
To some extent, the close intertwining between universities and local communities was a consequence of limited federal funding, which increased universities' reliance on state and industry funding. The connection was so strong that, according to some observers, a large share of American university research was essentially industrial problem solving, at least until the 1920's (Bruce 1987; Geiger, 2004) . University-industry linkages were evident in the pharmaceutical sector, where companies such as Squibb, Eli Lilly, Merck and Upjohn supported many university research programs (Swann, 1988) . In other industries such as railroads, oil refining, and electrical lighting, firms relied upon independent inventors, but also tried to engage university scientists as consultants. After World War I, federal support for basic research grew but the commitment was less than complete, as exemplified by Hale, Millikan, and others' failed attempt to create a German-style, national scientific laboratory devoted to basic research (Hounshell, 1996) .
Corporate investments in in-house laboratories were also initially quite modest. The leading American firms of the 1870s and 1880s, such as the railroad companies and Western Union, mostly relied on external inventions. However, during the 1870s, the leading railroad companies began employing college trained engineers to perform tests and gather data more systematically. Over time,they established industrial labs to evaluate the quality of these external inventions and other inputs (Usselman, 1991; Mowery, 1995; Hounshell, 1996; Carlson, 2013) . For instance, the Pennsylvania Railroad's chemical laboratory in Altoona, established in 1876, focused on the standardization and testing of supplies such as steel rails and lubricating oils. Innovation, when it occurred, was quite incremental in nature. While Pennsylvania Railroad was quick in the adoption of many important inventions, these mostly came from independent inventors such as George Westinghouse (Usselman, 1984) .
This division of innovative labor between large corporations, which focused on improvements and commercialization, and small firms and individual inventors, which focused on invention, was supported by an active market for technology, especially in the 1880-1920 period (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999) . These markets for technology, however, did not remain vibrant for long. During the inter-war years, corporations grew larger and more anxious to control and "routinize" innovation.
Their propensity to rely on external inventions decreased. The possible reasons are varied but include the growing importance of patents in oligopolistic competition, which made research a more important source of competitive advantage; anti-trust pressures, which reduced alternative sources of growth besides internal research; and the rising cost of invention, which made it difficult for inventors to continue to operate independently (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999; Hounshell, 1996) .
As a result, corporate investments in internal research grew rapidly. For instance, using National
Research Council survey data, Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) show that employment of scientists and engineers in US manufacturing industries, steadily rose from less than 3,000 in 1921 to nearly 46,000 in 1946.
1940-1980:
The age of Big Science. The victory in World War II was a watershed moment for American science. The victory was attributed at least in part to the ability of the US government to mobilize the US scientific community and channel a massive research effort to military and industrial purposes. The atomic bomb was without doubt the most prominent example of the power of science (for better or for worse), but developments such as the radar and the mass production of penicillin also played an important role. The result was a very significant surge in the status of science and scientists among policymakers and the general public. This shift had major effects on the funding of research.
Most notably, federal support for research and development in universities expanded very rapidly. Table 1, which updates Table 2 A second significant change was the shift in the composition of academic R&D towards the basic research end of the spectrum. While linkages between universities and industry remained strong in the US, the notion that universities' primary mission is advance the frontiers of knowledge gained momentum. Table 2 , which updates Table 4 
Please insert Tables 1 and 2 here
The growing practical applicability of recently discovered scientific principles, landmark inventions derived from scientific discoveries (e.g., vacuum tubes, radio, synthetic rubber, nylon), and the rapid increase in government funding in the United States also led to more companies investing in internal research after World War II. The earlier commercial successes of scientific discoveries by companies such as Du Pont and General Electric lent credibility to the idea that investments in research could be a source of competitive advantage. Evidence from the largest 200 US manufacturing firms indicates that, during the period preceding World War II , investments in R&D tended to reinforce the position of dominant firms (Mowery, 1983) . Corporations such as AT&T, Merck, Kodak, IBM, and Xerox subscribed to the view that research was the key to growth. They employed thousands of scientists whose chief objective was to conduct research. At its peak in the late 1960's, AT&T's Bell Labs employed 15,000 people, about 1,200 of which had PhDs (Gertner, 2013). To date, its alumni include 14 Nobel Prize winners and 5 recipients of the Turing Award.
Innovations attributable to Bell Labs include the transistor, fiber optics, lasers, cellular telephony, the C programming language, and the Unix operating system. Perhaps not coincidentally, the increasing scientific and entrepreneurial activity of universities and university-spawned start-ups coincided with a relative decline in corporate research. Corporate spending on research in the U.S. declined substantially as a share of total R&D expenditure. Figure   1 shows that the share of basic and applied research in corporate R&D in the United States dropped from 28% in 1985 to less than 20% in 2015.
Please insert Figure 1 here
Focusing on public companies and using data on corporate publications in scientific journals as a measure of corporate research, Arora et al. (2017) also find a marked drop in corporate research in a wide range of industries (see Figures 2a and 2b) . Further, they find that the drop reflects both a decline of research by established firms as well as the entry of many firms that perform little research, and that this decline is associated with a reduction of the private value of research.
Please insert Figure 2a and 2b here
Several factors may help explain the drop in corporate publications, including globalization and short-termism in corporate decision making. One potential explanation is that research itself is less relevant for innovation. For instance, it is sometimes claimed that certain types of innovation (e.g., business methods, design innovations) or innovation in IT intensive industries largely do not build on scientific advances. If true, this would imply that science has become socially less valuable, and overall investment in research should be lower. Figure 3 does not substantiate the view that science has become less relevant for invention, as measured by patents. As Figure 3 shows, patents cite the science and engineering literature at ever increasing rates, and the share of science and engineering publications cited has not fallen. Science remains useful to invention.
Please insert Figure 3 here
The decline in corporate publications may reflect the increasing reliance on external knowledge by corporations. Corporations may not invest in research because a lot of useful research is already being produced by external institutions. Arora, Belenzon and Sheer (2017) show that the decline is related to a reduction in the use of internal research and an increase in the use of external science, as measured by citations to scientific publications by corporate patents. Thus, large firms may be withdrawing from internal research to concentrate on development, while absorbing external research from universities and start-ups.
Please insert Figure 4 here 
A model of the evolution of the US innovation ecosystem
In this section, we develop a simple model of the evolution of the US innovation ecosystem. Inventions can be produced by large firms in their labs and by smaller, science-based start-ups. Large firms commercialize the inventions that they generate internally; however, if they fail to innovate, they can commercialize inventions produced by start-ups. Thus, markets for technology reduce the large firms' incentives to invest in internal research by giving them an "outside option"-external inventions. The risk is that start-ups may not come up with inventions that are either numerous enough or good enough to satisfy the large firms' growth needs.
Universities perform a dual function. They create scientific knowledge on which large and small firms can build, and employ scientists who may start their own businesses. Thus, universities are a source of both knowledge and start-ups. The trends that shape the evolution of the innovation ecosystem are (i) the increasing usefulness of science to invention and (ii) the growth of the university sector, which spurs start-up formation. Science becomes increasingly useful over time because, as the scientific knowledge base grows, it might become increasingly possible to combine new results with existing knowledge, spurring innovation through recombination.
We find that investments in internal research first grows and then declines. The intuition is that initially science is insufficiently useful for commercial applications that large firms can justify substantial investments in internal research. The scientific base on which they can build is limited.
It is better to rely on external inventions, even if these are not plentiful. However, as scientific knowledge accumulates and opportunities for recombination increase, the incentives to invest in internal research also increase. The large lab is created, and more inventions are internal. Eventually, however, as the university sector grows large, external inventions become abundant. At some point, this external option becomes attractive. Large firms cut their internal research budgets, and we return to a situation where most inventions are external, although overall innovation rates are higher.
More formally, consider a setting where there is a single large firm in an industry. In each period t = 1, 2..., T , there are two stages. In the first stage, the large firm invests in internal research. Let p be the probability that the investment generates a potentially useful scientific discovery. (To avoid clutter, for the moment we omit to specify how the parameters of the model vary with t.)
If the firm is successful in generating a scientific discovery, then with probability β this discovery is recombined with other relevant scientific knowledge to produce an invention of value V . Thus, β provides a measure of the extent of the existing scientific knowledge base. The cost of internal research associated with a probability of scientific discovery p is 1 2 cp 2 . Thus, the payoff from internal research is
We could equivalently write this problem in terms of the number of scientists x employed in a corporate lab. For instance, we could assume that p(x) = α 2 √ x is the probability that a lab employing x scientists will make a scientific discovery. Then With probability 1 − pβ, however, internal research fails to produce an invention. In the second stage, then the firm will search for an external invention. Thus we assume that commercializing an internal invention and commercializing an external invention are mutually exclusive options.
That is, the large firm cannot pursue both, perhaps due to limits to managerial attention, or financial constraints. From the point of view of the large firm, internal and external inventions are substitutes. 6 The probability that the external research sector (universities and other research institutions)
comes up with a discovery that is potentially useful to the large firm is r. As before, this external discovery must be recombined with existing knowledge to bear fruit, which occurs with probability β. There are two types of start-ups that attempt to commercialize the discovery. One type, labelled f 1 , collaborates with the large firm. This could be because f 1 lacks critical complementary assets necessary to commercialize the invention. Let ψ 1 be the probability that the collaboration between f 1 and the large firm proves viable. The probability of collaboration failure 1 − ψ 1 may reflect frictions in the market for technology or lack of trust or communication between the firms. Thus, rβψ 1 is the probability that start-up f 1 and the large firm commercialize the invention together.
A second type of start-up, labeled f 2 , attempts to bring the invention to market on its own (that is, without collaborating with the large firm). Let ψ 2 be the probability that this 'standalone' startup succeeds in bringing this invention to market. The parameter ψ 2 may capture the availability of public and private funding for early-stage science-based ventures. Thus, rβψ 2 is the probability that a start-up will be able to commercialize the invention on its own.
We assume that f 1 and f 2 are attempting to develop similar inventions based on the same fundamental scientific discovery. Thus, the social value that they create, v, is the same regardless of whether only one or both innovate. Nevertheless, because f 1 and f 2 follow different approaches in implementing and commercializing the invention, there are benefits to society when multiple paths to market are pursued. While one venture may fail, the other may succeed.
If both start-ups innovate, then they compete in the market. In that case, we assume that with probability θ the start-up f 1 wins the market and obtains v, and with probability 1 − θ the start-up f 2 wins the market and obtains v. θ may be larger than 1/2 if, for instance, the large firm brings to the partnership important complementary assets. If f 1 innovates but f 2 does not, then f 1 wins the market and obtains v, and similarly if only f 2 innovates.
If the start-up f 1 wins the market, then the value v is split between f 1 and the large firm. We assume that a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of v goes to the large firm, and a fraction 1 − λ of v goes to f 1 .
Given these assumptions, the large firm maximize:
with respect to p, where (1−pβ) is the probability that internal research fails, rβψ 1 is the probability that f 1 comes up with an external invention and, conditional on this, ψ 2 θ+(1−ψ 2 ) is the probability of f 1 winning the market.
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal level of internal research effort is given by: 7
The probability that the external discovery is commercialized, P M Ext , is given by the probability that the standalone start-up f 2 innovates, plus the probability that f 1 succeeds when f 2 fails. Thus
where rβ is the probability that an external discovery is made and is applicable to industry, ψ 2 is the probability that the innovation is introduced by the standalone start-up, and (1−p M β)ψ 1 (1 − ψ 2 ) is the probability that the innovation is introduced by the collaborative start-up when the standalone start-up is unsuccessful. Note that because the large firm only collaborates with f 1 when internal research fails, P M Ext is decreasing in p M .
We use equation (3.4) to study how internal research varies over time. Two key observations from the previous section are that, over the last 150 years, (i) US universities grew substantially in importance and scientific capabilities and that (ii) science became increasingly useful to industry.
To capture these facts, we assume that, over the relevant time period t ∈ [0, T ], both the probability of external discovery, r, and the probability scientific discoveries can usefully be recombined with the existing knowledge base, β, grow with t. Specifically, we assume as a first approximation that 8 ' 9 r = r 0 t and β = β 0 t. 8 Because r and β are probabilities, r0, β 0 , and T must be such that r0T ≤ 1 and β 0 T ≤ 1. 9 In discussing why around the 1920's in-house corporate labs supplanted the individual inventor, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999) mention the rising cost of the human and physical capital required for invention, which made it difficult for inventors to continue to operate independently, and the emergence of large firms with significant market power, which made patents an increasingly important factor in oligopolistic competition. In our model, the increasing importance of patents can be captured by an increase in V and v. This effect is similar to the effect of an increase in β, which is what we assume. (ii). Internal research is higher at its peak (p M ( t) large) in countries where
Because American universities grew substantially during the 20th century, result (i) suggests that the US should exhibit the trend of rise and fall of internal research earlier than other countries.
Because the size of the US market m is also very large (and tends to matter more than r 0 ), result (ii) also suggests that the most prominent examples of internal research may be observed in the US.
Diversity and social welfare
Next, we compare the outcome of this market economy, (p M , P M Ext ), with the outcome that would be selected by a planner trying to maximize social welfare p S , P S Ext . Throughout, we will assume that the firms that win the market extract the full social value of their inventions. This extreme assumption eliminates a typical source of market inefficiency, namely underinvestment in R&D due to imperfect appropriability of the returns from innovation. Nevertheless, as we will see, inefficiencies
remain. In our model, large firms can either underinvest or overinvest in internal research, depending on parameter values. Thus, our underinvestment problem would be exacerbated if there was also the traditional imperfect appropriability problem, whereas our overinvestment problem would be mitigated.
If the firms that win the market are able to extract the full social value arising from their innovations, then social welfare SW is simply the sum of the firms' profits:
pβV − 1 2 cp 2 is the welfare created by the large firm's internal research efforts. prβ 2 ψ 2 v is the welfare originating from the external scientific discovery when internal research is successful (in that case, only firm f 2 can bring the external invention to market).
welfare originating from the external discovery when internal research fails. Note that in that case society obtains v when either f 1 or f 2 succeed in bringing the invention to market, which occurs with probability 1
Maximizing social welfare (3.5) with respect to p yields
The socially optimal probability that the external discovery is commercialized, P S Ext , is therefore
Equations (3.7) and (3.4)) are identical, except that in P S Ext we replace p M with p S . Note that we have P S Ext < P M Ext whenever p S > p M , and P S Ext > P M Ext whenever p S < p M . Underivestment in internal research and socially excessive levels of open innovation are closely intertwined. Indeed, if the external research sector did not exist, the private and social value of internal research would coincide and would both be given by (3.1). Thus, underinvestment in internal research is caused by an excessive incentive (from society's standpoint) to engage in open innovation, and conversely for overinvestment in internal research.
Proposition 2 (Diversity).
Comparing the market solution (p M , P M Ext ) with the socially efficient solution (p S , P S Ext ), we have that
Thus, the market solution tends to exhibit underinvestment in internal research and excessively high levels of open innovation when ψ 2 , θ and λ are large, and overinvestment in internal research and excessively low levels of open innovation when ψ 2 , θ and λ are small.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2, consider the special case when standalone start-ups cannot independently commercialize the external discovery: ψ 2 = 0. Then, the large firm
which, assuming an interior solution, yields a level of investment in internal research,
. This level of investment is excessive from society's viewpoint because society values the external innovation v, whereas the large firm only values it λv. The outside option when internal research fails is bigger for society than it is for the large firm. As a result, the large firm overinvests in internal research and the probability that an external innovation is created is too low.
Conversely, consider the case when the standalone start-up can always commercialize an external invention: ψ 2 = 1. Then, from society's perspective, the value of the collaboration between the large firm and start-up f 2 is zero: their innovation just duplicates the innovation of the standalone startup. Nevertheless, the large firm still has some incentive to collaborate with the start-up because, if they introduce an innovation, with probability θ they will win the market. As a result, the large firm has an excessive incentive to engage in collaboration, and thus underinvests in internal research with the number of firms seeking to innovate. However, insofar as firms differ in the approaches for solving the same problem, their efforts are substitutes from society's viewpoint. In our model, large and small firms attempt to solve different problems, due perhaps to differences in internal resources. By contrast, small firms try to solve similar problems but follow different approaches (if both start-ups succeed, the social value of the second innovation is zero; however, one start-up can fail while the other can succeed). In our model, investment in internal research promotes diversity in the types of problems that firms try to solve; collaboration, by contrast, promotes diversity in the approaches used to try to solve similar problems. The model suggests that investment in internal research is likely to be too low and incentives to collaborate are likely to be too high when there is already an active community of start-ups that could independently commercialize their inventions (ψ 2 big). This is likely to be the case for sectors where financial support from government or venture capital is abundant, and logistics and distribution are relatively simple.
The benefits of diversity
Recent evidence indicates that, in the last few decades, large corporations have withdrawn from internal research. From this fact alone, one cannot conclude that American innovation is at risk.
An ecosystem where research is mostly performed by universities and start-ups may be nimbler and more efficient than one where large corporations and their labs play a more important role.
Nevertheless, the opposite view that changes in an innovation ecosystem are always beneficial is also simplistic. As the model above shows, the incentives of large firms to engage in collaboration and open innovation may be excessive from society's standpoint. Large labs may produce innovations that are qualitatively different from those produced by smaller firms. The demise of the large corporate lab may reduce social welfare by reducing diversity in the types of innovations produced.
There are several reasons why large firms may focus on innovations that are different from those created by universities or small firms. First, large firms' research may differ from small firms'
research because large firms have access to greater financial resources and can tackle multidisciplinary problems by integrating multiple knowledge streams and capabilities (Tether, 1998; Pisano, 2010) . In the semiconductor industry, for instance, Kapoor (2013) An advantage of large corporate labs is that they can organize their research by problem, rather than by discipline, the approach generally taken by universities. Germany's slow entry to the 10 For instance, focusing on the pharmaceutical industry, Angell (2004) finds that, of the 1,072 drugs approved in the US by the FDA between 1993 and 2004, only 33% were new molecular entities (NME) and not just variations of existing drugs. Interestingly, the origins of 75% of these NMEs could be traced to research by the National Institutes of Health. By contrast, private pharmaceutical companies appear much more focused on generating less novel, "me too" drugs. biotechnology sector, for example, has been partly attributed to the rigidity of German university departments (Rosenberg, 1991) . Furthermore, commercialization of university research may be subject to 'frictions', such as geographical isolation from the relevant industry actors (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013; Bikard and Marx, 2015) . This may hinder or delay technology transfer from universities to industry. Consistent with this, as Bikard (2015) Texas Instruments is revealing. Texas Instruments was much better managed than Fairchild but also spawned far fewer spin-offs. This suggests the paradoxical conclusion that incompetence in managing a leading firm may be, for society at least, a blessing in disguise. It is likely, in fact, that the spin-offs resulting from the mismanagement of people and research at Fairchild encouraged diversity and innovation far more than the efforts of a well-run Fairchild could have. Consistent with this view, Chesbrough (2002 Chesbrough ( , 2003 finds that stronger links between Xerox and the spin-offs it generated tended to inhibit spin-off performance. The key problem was not Xerox's initial equity position in the spin-offs per se, but Xerox's practices in managing the spin-offs, which discouraged experimentation by forcing them to look for applications close to Xerox's existing businesses.
Conclusion
As documented here and in related work, large US firms are investing less in scientific research and focusing more on development. This evidence is consistent with a division of innovative labor where universities specialize in research, small start-ups convert promising new findings into inventions and larger, more established firms specialize in product development and commercialization.
While this division of innovative labor may be efficient insofar as large firms have a comparative advantage in the commercialization of inventions rather than in coming up with scientific discoveries, this paper strikes a more cautionary note. Using a simple model, we show that, even in the absence of appropriability problems, large firms may underinvest in internal research. In our model, large and small firms focus on solving different types of problems. Large firms can use their assets either to commercialize their internal inventions, or to commercialize external inventions created by startups. We show that, although there are benefits in duplicating start-up research efforts (as any one start-up may fail), sometimes large firms have an excessive incentive to engage in collaboration with start-ups. This happens when large firms leverage their complementary assets to win market with start-up inventions, even when other start-ups are already trying to commercialize similar inventions. Society, on the other hand, may have a preference for greater investment in internal research, as this would result in greater diversity of innovations. Thus, the risk we highlight is that open innovation may tend to crowd out types of research for which large corporate labs have a comparative advantage.
In addition, of course, internal research may suffer from appropriability problems. Research is an activity that is well-known to produce important spillovers. Increasing competition, by exacerbating appropriability problems, may reduce the private incentives to invest in internal research, even if its social value is large.
There is a long tradition in economics, starting perhaps with Alfred Marshall, that argues that diversity in organizational forms, technologies, products, and processes is a chief source of economic growth (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Nelson, 1990; Rosenberg, 1992; Cohen and Malerba, 2001 ). In recent times, one key component of the US innovation ecosystem-the large corporate lab-has withered away. We find that a reason for concern. "R"
